Friday, May 26, 2006

Crash Stock: ACCS 0 comments



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With the admission of guilt of ACCS founder and former CEO Victor Tan to charges of fraud as announced in the papers today, the corporate scandal of ACCS that first erupted in February 2005 and brought the high-flying stock to the pits comes to a close. The company was once a stock market darling worth S$800M in market capitalisation but today trades at less than one-eighth that value.

In early February 2005 ACCS was trading at 85 cents, a trailing PE of 25 times. Since its IPO in 2002, it had displayed stellar performance, showing near doubling of revenues and net profits every year till then. It had the backing of the investors with the Midas touch -- 2G Capital. Its business captured the imagination of investors and traders alike --- its rapidly expanding after-market maintenance services for mobile phones captured two popular themes: the regional outsourcing story and the mobile phone theme. Its subsidiary, DMS (in the business of phone distribution), was on the verge of listing, which would bring its parent exit gains. It is amazing, on retrospect, that within one week the whole world would come crashing down.

On 18 February, the company made a late-night announcement that it was ceasing its AMS (after-market services) for Nokia in several countries, spooking the market despite company assurances ("just pricing issues") and concurring analyst reports ("impact on financials minimal, maintain target prices"). One learns to respect the movement of the market; it behaved in a volatile manner on heavy volume despite these assurances and four days later the bomb dropped --- the Commercial Affairs Department announced that it was launching an investigation into ACCS, which subsequently admitted to overstating revenue in the previous quarter "in relation to one particular contract in Singapore with a customer of the company", and cancelled its listing of DMS. In the wake of CAO and Citiraya the market was sufficiently alarmed to bring it to below 40 cents, or half of its early-February valuation. Even a stellar set of FY04 results announced around the same time, showing another year of revenue and profit doubling, wasn't much help --- investors no longer knew what to trust.

The stock was a journalist's dream in the next few months, for all the wrong reasons. In March it attracted a suitor in Singpost who proposed to take an eventual 30% stake, but this was called off after much publicity about how Singpost's chairman's and director's (Tommie Goh) ACCS holdings presented a conflict of interest. The forced selling of Victor Tan's ACCS stake (ostensibly to meet margin calls) and similar disposals by co-founder Ronnie Poh provided further corroborating signs of the company's troubles. Finally, the second bombshell dropped in May 06 with the results of Price Waterhouse's investigations into the "overstatement of revenue" issue.

The special auditor had uncovered a whole can of worms. The 3Q04 revenue overstatement was not siginificant, but refurbishment revenue and profit had been massively overstated for the whole of FY03 and FY04. The overstatement of the revenue and profit before tax amounted to approximately S$22 million and S$19 million respectively for FY03 and approximately S$60 million and S$54 million respectively for FY04 in relation to the refurbishment business of the group. One look at the figures and one knows that this refurbishment business was dodgy: what kind of business model could for example, let one earn $54M profit on $60M revenue ie. profit margin of 90%?

The net effect of this revelation was that FY03 was just a marginal profit year while FY04 was in fact a loss-incurring year. Which means there was no meaning to the earnings multiple anymore. The company had to make massive provisions to investments and receivables, reducing net asset base to 4 cents per share --- the new base for further share price consolidation.

The entry of Philip Eng, the former CEO of Jardine Cycle and Carriage, as the new ACCS chairman later in the year helped to bring some cheer to the company. There was probably a special reason for bringing him in in addition to prestige: he had been through loss of a key distributorship before at C&C, when they lost the Mercedes-Benz account. The early optimism soon evaporated, as the company continued to make further downward revisions to FY03 and FY04 losses (eventually amounting to >S$35M losses in each year!) while issuing another set of red ink in FY05. In June 05, I had written a Hotstocksnot article against ACCS, which was justified by later events.

The company's former CFO has recently admitted to corporate fraud against Nokia and falsifying financial statements, while Victor Tan has pleaded guilty to collaborating with him in falsifying claims for the repair of Nokia handphones, for faking a "thriving" refurbishment business (using company funds), and for issuing false financial statements. Over 10 others in ACCS have been implicated in this massive fraud.

What signs were there to prevent the investor/trader from entering this stock in the first place? The PE was too high at >20, to begin with. It was the pressure to maintain the phenomenal growth rate expected by the market that might have driven the ACCS management to tamper with their accounts .... the same market pressure that drove CAO's Chen Jiulin to direct speculation in oil derivatives. If one had been in the stock when the loss of the Nokia contract was announced, a cut-loss or selling into strength on the subsequent day might have been adopted hence avoiding the follow-up carnage --- a cockroach on the kitchen floor might hint at many more in the closet. Lastly, never hope ---- just react. As the spate of unfavourable news poured in, one should have known better than hold and hope for the tide to turn. Fundamentals trends are terribly difficult to turn.

References:
(1) Straits Times articles Feb till Aug 2005, covering ACCS (obtained from the Shareinvestor website)

 

 

Tuesday, May 23, 2006

Black Monday 1987 0 comments



(P.S: Sorry for any disturbances the advertisements above may have caused you)
In the wake of two local "Black Mondays" I thought it would be a good time to outline one of the original Black Mondays.

How much has the STI dropped in each of the last two Mondays which witnessed the largest drops compared to other subsequent days of the week? About 3% on each day. Compared to Black Monday in the US on Oct 19 1987, this was small fry: on that day, the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) fell by 23% in the course of one day. Statistically, it is not hard to conclude that many stocks probably fell by 50% or more in one day alone.

What is it about Mondays? In the other major collapse of the 20th century, 1929, it was also a 13% collapse on a Monday (October 28) that triggered a secular bear and the Great Depression; the greatest point loss in DJIA history was also on a Monday(17 September 2001, 685 points). Someone (think it's Peter Lynch) has suggested a possible reason: people have plenty of time to think over things over the weekend, and the sensation-seeking press will always make sure that they have plenty of things to worry about: trade deficits, budget deficits, rising inflation etc. So come Monday people will have made up their minds to sell off some assets and revert to cash. When enough people worry in this way, the result is a market sell-off that if uncontrolled could feed on its own momentum.

The cause of the dramatic collapse on that fateful day in 1987 are still debated by academics to this day but suffice to say that it cannot have been due to long-term fundamental factors. The best evidence was that the market recovered to its previous level within a year, and then proceeded on another decade of bull run --- the longest sustained secular bull in history.

The Black Monday market collapse in the US was probably triggered by earlier market collapses in overseas markets earlier (the US market lags Asia by ~12 hours, as seasoned investors may well know). Markets in Asia and parts of Europe had already posted heavy losses before the New York markets opened, which drew its lead from there.

Program trading has been the most-oft quoted single reason for creating and sustaining the market panic of Black Monday, so I'll discuss it although one should be aware that in post-mortems it is always easier to blame a system or institutional structure (in this case, computerised trading) than the humans involved. There are two main types of program trading being blamed here: index arbitrage and portfolio insurance. Index arbitrage takes advantage of discrepancies between markets by simultaneously buying in one and offsetting that purchase with a short position of the same size in another closely linked market. Portfolio insurance involves the sale of stock index futures to protect the value of a falling stock portfolio. These strategies are supposed to hedge against losses in fund managers' portfolios by adopting offsetting futures positions to underlying index/stock positions (compare this to the "convergence trades" practised by Long-Term Capital Management; however in a market panic what happens of course is that falling stock prices triggers fall in futures prices (as the latter are being sold to hedge) and which in turn feeds back to further falling stock prices. What might have been a self-stabilising situation under normal market conditions turned into a destabilising system. This explains the swiftness and extent of the market collapse, and also underlines the close linkages between the stock and futures markets that had developed by then.

As mentioned above, market players also had plenty to worry about. The thing about the markets is that it can be similar to marriage life: issues can be simmering below the surface while the market chugs along, but on a bad day all these can suddenly come into public consciousness and create continuous waves of psychological panic. Those who have experienced the SGX market correction these few days can testify to this: one moment everybody (including, if not especially, the analysts) were calling for a smoothly-rising economy and stock market in 2006, the next moment issues like high oil prices, rising interest rates, a weak US dollar, political instabilities (in the Middle East and South America), a slowing China, a commodities collapse suddenly float to the surface. In 1987 the issues were as follows: Iran-US spat, declining US dollar, high interest rates, high trade deficit. I suppose you can draw exact parallels between the macroeconomic concerns then and now (with the exception of the China issue). History works in mysterious ways.

At the same time, some also quoted the possible reason of US market overvaluation. The S&P was trading at 19X PE in 1987, an above-average valuation that might have formed a fundamental basis for selling down, in the minds of investors and fund managers on Black Monday. However, subsequent strong corporate earnings through the rest of the decade and beyond might have judtified this valuation.

All these factors probably contributed to creating and extending a crisis of confidence on the big day, and then accentuated (instead of nullified) by the emotionless computers through program trading. They also accentuated the problems of academicians, hitherto the preachers of the "rational investor" theory and Efficient Market Hypothesis. How could a 23% single-day drop justify their assumption that investors were rational or that the market was efficiently priced (fundamentals couldn't have declined 23% in one day)? That's why it was convenient to blame structural weaknesses (ie. program trading) for the collapse.

In the wake of the crash, markets around the world were put on restricted trading primarily because sorting out the orders that had come in was beyond the computer technology of the time. This also gave the Federal Reserve and other central banks time to pump liquidity into the system, as well as lowering short-term rates, to prevent a further downdraft. Market suspensions in the wake of drastic collapses are still practised to this day (eg. the Sensex market suspension just yesterday) to allow liquidity injections and for investors to come to their senses. Some call the Black Monday of 1987 a selling climax, where the excess value was squeezed out of the system. It reinforced the market collapses in international markets, such that by the end of October, stock markets in Australia had fallen 42%, Canada 23%, Hong Kong a whopping 46%, and the UK 26%. As mentioned earlier, the rebound from Black Monday was swift as well, and ultimately the US market recovery in 1988 onwards led the way out of the blue for world markets.

References:
(1) Wikipedia entry: Black Monday 1987
(2) Stock Market Crash Net: Black Monday- the Stock Market Crash of 1987
(3) Sniper.net: Stock market crash - Black Monday - October 1987
(4) Lope Markets: The 1987 Stock Market Crash

 

 

Saturday, May 13, 2006

Personalities: Wall Street Influentials 0 comments



DanielXX's intro: I saw an article in Salvator Dali's blog Malaysia-Finance Blogspot that listed down the current key influential people on Wall Street (extracted from New York Magazine). While they (mainly investment bankers, private equity heads and fund managers) probably do not deserve individual mention in separate articles, they represent the movers and shakers on Wall Street currently. So I had to cut and paste the article here.

(P.S: The following were extracted from another source and is not my original work.)

Generally I do not want to do much cut and paste, but this piece from New York Magazine is worth reading. The magazine did a report on the influential people in 24 categories, naturally we are interested in the Wall Street category. Of the entire group, I think Gene Marcial and David Swensen are the standouts in my books (especially Swensen).

Henry Paulson - Chairman and CEO, Goldman Sachs. Wall Street’s last king. Paulson, who has presided over Wall Street’s most storied investment bank since 1998, just delivered Goldman’s most profitable—US$2.6 billion—quarter on record. A list of the most influential people on Wall Street could be mostly Goldman Sachs executives, and it wouldn’t be wrong. Though much smaller than the megabanks, no institution is more scrutinized, none more illustrious, and none more dominant than Goldman. And, possibly, none more arrogant: The firm has recently been accused of courting conflict; it worked both sides of the NYSE-Archipelago deal. Paulson has refashioned Goldman into a trading-profits-mad virtual hedge fund. Credit president, COO, and heir apparent Lloyd Blankfein, a former trader whose path upward was smoothed by the departure of former crown prince John Thain. Today, traders trump i-bankers in the pecking order at Goldman, and Hank Paulson’s bet on Blankfein is a bet that the trading side can keep the money rolling in.

John Thain - CEO, NYSE Group. Thain is killing the floor trader to save the exchange. Just three years after the ouster of his infamous US$187 million–earning predecessor, Dick Grasso, Thain has revolutionized the Big Board by merging it with its electronic rival Archipelago Holdings. Grasso got the publicity, but it’s Thain, who came from the banking side of Goldman Sachs, who’s changed the exchange fundamentally, transforming the 214-year-old member-owned not-for-profit into a publicly listed, modernized trading powerhouse that today plays home to 2,780 stocks worth a combined US$22.5 trillion. The Archipelago deal also signaled the death knell of the exchange’s storied trading floor, rendered virtually obsolete by electronic trading. By the way, Thain’s salary is US$6 million.

Jamie Dimon - CEO, JPMorgan Chase. The most closely watched man on Wall Street, even if he’s mostly watched for what he hasn’t yet done. After being sacked as Citigroup president by Sandy Weill in 1998, Dimon retreated to Chicago and overhauled Bank One. The prodigal son returned two years ago, when JPMorgan snapped up Bank One. Still untested as CEO (he took over from Bill Harrison in January), Dimon made his first, relatively small-time move last month, nabbing parts of Bank of New York to cement his lead in New York–area retail banking, and the purchase looks astute. The charismatic Dimon is seen as Weill’s spiritual heir, the most dynamic guy on the Street, in contrast to Weill’s actual successor at Citigroup, Chuck Prince, a lawyer and caretaker CEO put into place to solve Citi’s Spitzer problems.

Stanley O’Neal - CEO and president, Merrill Lynch. The turnaround artist. When O’Neal assumed the top post of the world’s largest brokerage firm in 2002, Merrill Lynch was a perennial also-ran in underwriting and M&A advisory work. O’Neal slimmed down Merrill, paring a third of the firm’s staff and shedding less-profitable businesses. Merrill’s stock doubled and profits tripled to US$5 billion. As rivals John Mack of Morgan Stanley and Dick Fuld of Lehman Brothers scramble to find growth opportunities, O’Neal found his in an Upper East Side diner earlier this year. Over eggs and cereal, he unloaded Merrill’s US$549 billion asset-management business to Larry Fink’s BlackRock, beating out Mack for the deal. In return, his 15,000 brokers get access to BlackRock’s US$1 trillion worth of assets.

Larry Fink - Chairman and CEO, BlackRock. The most-wanted money manager on Wall Street. Critics griped that Fink, a veteran bond trader, couldn’t sustain BlackRock’s 21.5% average annual profit growth based on its bond exposure. So Fink responded in February by snapping up Merrill Lynch’s investment-management business in exchange for 49.8% of his firm, a breathtaking deal that gives Fink’s asset-management juggernaut access to an astonishing US$1 trillion portfolio second only in size to Fidelity’s. The deal also keeps BlackRock, whose shares have risen tenfold since going public in 1999, firmly in Fink’s control. Industry watchers took note of the larger picture: One of the Street’s biggest bond buyers was taking his money and running . . . to the stock market.

Carl Icahn - Founder, Icahn Partners. Wall Street’s most notorious predator still breathes fire. More than twenty years after he perfected the dark art of corporate extortion dubbed greenmail, Icahn’s presence still inspires shudders in executive suites worldwide. These days, he conducts his hostile takeovers under the spit-polished label of “shareholder activist,” aligning his US$2 billion eponymous hedge fund with embittered shareholders. His modus operandi rarely varies. Either he battles management for changes aimed at prodding stagnant share prices—as in his bid to break up Time Warner—or he actually seizes a company and installs cost-cutting managers. Scores of aggressive hedge funds and private-equity managers, including Warren Lichtenstein of Steel Partners, and Pirate Capital’s Zachary George, take their cues from the Icahn preybook.

Steven Cohen - Chairman and CEO, SAC Capital. The hedge-fund heavyweight Cohen literally moves markets. He controls one of Wall Street’s most powerful trading firms, believed to account for as much as 3% of the NYSE’s daily volume. (That’s something like 60 million shares per day traded by SAC alone.) The phenom commands 50% fees; lesser managers get 20%. Last year, he reportedly pocketed $500 million. No wonder he has spawned countless imitators, as B-school grads shun Wall Street in favor of Greenwich, Connecticut, home to more than 100 hedge funds, including SAC. Worth an estimated US$2.5 billion, Cohen has become one of the most aggressive art collectors in the world; it was a seismic event when he started buying Impressionist works again last fall after a contemporary binge.

Stephen Schwarzman- Chairman and CEO, Blackstone Group. Private equity used to be viewed as unseemly, reserved for louche Gordon Gekko wannabes. No longer. The king of the hill is Schwarzman, who waltzes in rarefied society circles as easily as boardrooms. (Schwarzman holds the most-vaunted of society thrones, chairmanship of the Kennedy Center.) Private equity rivals the hedge fund as the hottest kind of shop on Wall Street, but Schwarzman is ahead of the curve; Blackstone is rivaled only by Washington, D.C.’s Carlyle Group as the most successfully institutionalized private-equity firm. Like any superstar, Schwarzman has spawned scores of copycats, who’ve driven up prices and made good deals scarce. Still, despite the glut, Schwarzman was able to raise a US$12.5 billion fund last year.

Stephen Feinberg - CEO and senior managing director, Cerberus Capital Management. Named after the three-headed dog that guards the entrance to Hades, Cerberus once suffered a reputation as Wall Street’s scrappy pit bull, investing in ailing companies no one else wanted. But the secretive Feinberg has refashioned Cerberus, founded with a paltry US$10 million in 1992, into a gargantuan, do-it-all firm that controls companies with total sales topping McDonald’s and Coca-Cola’s. Cerberus recently bested legendary private-equity firm KKR to buy out GMAC, General Motors’s lending arm, and snatched up iconic brands such as the Albertsons grocery chain, Burger King and Alamo Rent A Car. Cerberus embodies the rise of a new, widely imitated business model, in which the old demarcation lines of hedge fund, LBO firm, or private equity don’t apply anymore. Though his image may have softened, Feinberg is still biting.

David E. Shaw - Chairman, D.E. Shaw & Co. The Bill Gates of computer finance. Wall Street’s resident math guru runs one of the world’s largest hedge funds, with US$20 billion under management. A former computer-science professor at Columbia, Shaw is a pioneer in quantitative investing, which relies on sophisticated computerized algorithms to profit from inefficiencies in the market. Famed for its exclusive hiring process, D.E. Shaw reportedly extends an offer to only one in 500 applicants. (Amazon.com founder Jeff Bezos is an alum.) An estimated 16% of hedge-fund assets are managed by “quants” like Shaw. Among his most serious disciples (and competition): Jim Simons of Renaissance Technologies and Ken Griffin of Citadel Investment Group.

Byron Wien - Chief investment strategist, Pequot Capital Management. Though fortune-telling is de rigueur on Wall Street, Wien’s predictions are anticipated with the sweaty angst reserved for interest-rate hikes. The former strategist at Morgan Stanley, who recently made the common Wall Street semi-retirement move of joining a private-equity firm, has been publishing his annual list of “Ten Surprises” since 1986; he hosts annual summer lunches at his Wainscott home, where finance titans like George Soros and Steve Schwarzman don futurist hats themselves.

David Swensen - Chief investment officer, Yale University. The intellectual godfather of the hedge-fund era. Swensen, superstar manager of Yale’s US$15.2 billion endowment (average annual return: 16 percent), was an early advocate of hedge-fund investing, which spurred traditionally conservative pension-fund and endowment managers to follow suit; their money has been the fuel of the hedge-fund boom—and they’re expected to pour US$300 billion more into hedge funds within two years. His 2000 book, Pioneering Portfolio Management, is revered; last year’s Unconventional Success, which came out blisteringly against mutual funds, is gaining a similar reputation among individual investors. Swensen has created a generation of fund managers. When managers set up their own fund, they look for an investment from Swensen; it’s the Good Housekeeping seal of approval. Incredibly, Swensen earns just US$1 million a year at Yale, though his Connecticut compadres easily command 50 times that.

Alan Hevesi - Comptroller, New York State. Hevesi administers the second-largest pension fund in the country, with a whopping US$140 billion in assets earmarked to pay retirement benefits for 968,000 current and former civil workers. Hevesi ended the year up 8.5%, beating the S&P 500 and his own benchmarks. Sweet vindication for the countless, some say gratuitous, street fights he’s picked with everyone from Governor Pataki, over the state budget, to WorldCom, which won Hevesi a US$6 billion settlement.

David Faber - Co-host, CNBC’s Squawk Box. What’s the breakfast of champions on Wall Street? Coffee, bagel, and Squawk Box, co-hosted by Faber, dubbed “the Brain” by fans. CNBC is a trading floor’s wallpaper, and Faber’s stature allows him to debunk Internet rumors in real time; he’s a lifesaver for corporate flacks. Though market data abounds online, and real scoops have proved elusive, Faber remains the man investors can’t afford to miss.

Gene Marcial - “Inside Wall Street” columnist, BusinessWeek. Main Street’s most-followed stock picker. Though mocked and dismissed by Wall Street professionals, Marcial, who has written the weekly “Inside Wall Street” column since 1981, buoys a stock with a mere mention in his column, often for only the first day the magazine appears. But that’s long enough to send investors scrambling for advance peeks. Last month, two workers at BusinessWeek’s Hartford, Wisconsin, printing plant were charged with stealing magazines off the presses to get an early start on Marcial’s picks.

Robert Rubin - Director and chairman of the executive committee, Citigroup. A god. But in finance, Rubin, the former Goldman Sachs trader who was Bill Clinton’s Treasury secretary, is not influential at all: Citigroup, where he’s been since 1999, has been hobbled by regulators. Yet Rubin is bigger than the Street: For his role in handling the 1997–98 Asian financial crisis, he’s become the living embodiment of the Clintonian idea that capitalism—and specifically globalization—can serve a moral purpose. And he’s the living case for the argument that Democrats can manage national economic policy more prudently than the other party.

(The above was extracted from Salvator Dali's excellent blogsite on the Malaysian stock market. It originated from the New York Magazine.

 

 

Thursday, May 04, 2006

Personalities: John Templeton 0 comments



(P.S: Sorry for any disturbances the advertisements above may have caused you)
Templeton Funds has just taken a placement stake in Asiapharm, and some might remember what happened following its takeup of a stake in Celestial Nutrifoods in December last year: the show of confidence in that stock sent it soaring and triggered a rally in the entire China stock sector. Templeton Funds today goes under the Franklin Templeton group following the acquisition of Templeton Growth Funds by Franklin Group in 1992; the hard work in building up the fund then had already been done by Sir John Templeton.

Templeton Growth Funds was started in 1954, Sir John Templeton's second startup from scratch after he had sold his original investment firm. He was at the ripe old age of fifty-six then, proof that age does not wear down the spirit of entrepreneurship. Each $100,000 invested then with distribution reinvested grew to total $55 million in 1999 --- a 15% CAGR over 45 years, an impressive long-term record by any measure (though he was less involved after 1992).

Great investors tend to have defining characteristics and ideas; for Sir John it is about searching for value in different markets. He is a value investor, no doubt about it, but the relentless search for value among different markets requires a commitment to value creation, contacts to provide relevant information, and above all a prodigious understanding of various global markets and the processing and analytical ability to sift out the key factors driving the buy decision. In this respect the man is not lacking: he was a Rhodes scholar with a degree in law from Oxford.

In his global search for value, Japan was a key country where Sir John concentrated his investment funds for much of his career, a consequence of his global search of value. PEs, for example, were one-third of that for comparables in the US and the West (the US has never been a favourite of Templeton). Given his global bargain-hunting style, it is important to single out countries that he is comfortable with, in order to scope down the search. In this respect, he looks for open economies with low socialistic tendencies and pro-investments (in this respect, he likes Singapore, incidentally). It is interesting to note how he determines value: to him , there are a hundred or so factors that can be considered in making an appraisal, but most of these are industry-specific; yet four are always present: (1)PE; (2)Operating profit margins; (3)Liquidating value (ie. NTA); (4)Growth rate (particularly its consistency). Most of us know the above four; it is probably the other hundred-odd factors that determine the degree of success....

The other key investment philosophy of Sir John is his emphasis on flexibility. In a sense this is perfectly understandable given his investing style of comparison-shopping (hence always ready to ditch one stock for a better one), and the confidence engendered by a wealth of knowledge (such as the above hundred-odd factors). This is contrast to technical analysts who follow "trading rules": it is as if they need to set OB markers to articifically manage their emotions and discipline. Flexibility is also a defining characteristic of George Soros; the whole idea is to be mentally alert and neither be complacent nor be wedded psychologically to the stocks/securities in one's portfolio. Don't trust rules and formulas, just use them as a guide.

Bargain hunters are often contrarian. Hence there are shades of Warren Buffett in Sir John's moves in the market (actually that would be unfair to Sir John, for he was operating before Buffett came onto the scene). Some examples of his moves: In 1939 he bought $100 worth of every New York Stock Exchange listed stock that was trading under $1 per share, on news of Hitler invading Poland (his motto: never sell on war news).In 1978, when Ford was near bankruptcy, he was a buyer. When everyone else piled into tech in 2000, he was a seller.

Signature moves from one of the Hall of Fame fund managers. We end with a half-joking quote from the man: "Help people. When people are desperately trying to sell, help them and buy. When people are enthusiastically trying to buy, help them and sell."

References:
(1) Money Masters of Our Time (John Train)
(2) John Templeton Foundation: Biography of Sir John Templeton
(3) 1 Apr 2004 SmartMoney interview with Sir John Templeton